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Ageing, Poverty, and the Role of a Social Pension in Vietnam 
 
 
Abstract 
By using the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey in 2004, this paper seeks to quantify the 
potential role and impacts of a social pension scheme for reducing elderly poverty in Vietnam. We 
simulate how the poverty rate, poverty gap, and poverty severity of the elderly would have been 
changed in the counterfactual situation that such a scheme had been introduced to Vietnam in the 
past. We consider a number of categorical targeting groups of elderly people along with various 
transfer parameters to assess the impacts of the scheme on social welfare. We find that, depending 
on the characteristics of the social pension, there would be beneficial poverty reductions, but also 
large leakages to the non-poor people. For a variety of measures, our results suggest that targeting 
the elderly in rural areas might be the most effective use of limited resources. Also, simulations for 
different budgetary constraints show that, even with limited budgeting, a social pension scheme 
would significantly reduce poverty incidence for the elderly. We also find that for a given program 
cost, combining lower benefits with lower eligibility requirements is more effective at reducing 
poverty than providing larger benefits to a more limited group of recipients.   
 
Keywords: ageing, poverty, social pensions, Vietnam 
JEL Classification: H55, I32, I38 
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ITRODUCTIO 
Rapid declines in fertility rates and mortality rates along with substantial improvements in 
health care systems have resulted in the growth of elderly populations around the world, and this 
trend is expected to continue in the coming years. With the definition of an elderly person as aged 
sixty years and over, the medium-variant population projections of the United Nations (2007) show 
that the number of elderly people will increase from 672 million in 2005 (or 10 per cent of the 
world population) to around two billion people in 2050 (or 22 per cent of the world population). 
Particularly in the developing countries that grow old before becoming rich, population ageing will 
especially present various challenges for public policies in the coming decades. In addition, under 
profound social and economic changes stemming from modernization and urbanization, the 
weakening of family bonds also suggests an urgent task for the old-age security in developing 
countries, where social security systems are underdeveloped with extremely limited coverage 
(Schwarz, 2003; United Nations, 2005; United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs (UN-DESA), 2007).  
As one of the best performing developing economies in the world, Vietnam is experiencing 
the changes just described. The aforementioned projections indicate that the elderly population in 
Vietnam will increase significantly from 7.6 per cent of the whole population in 2005 to about 26 
per cent in 2050. Moreover, swift economic transformation since Doi moi (renovation) programs in 
1986 has had significant impacts on all areas of society, resulting in substantial improvements in 
living standards for many people, including the elderly. However, while such remarkable successes 
have been widely acknowledged, many groups of elderly people are still living in poor and 
vulnerable conditions. The majority of elderly are still living in rural and disadvantaged areas, and 
only a small percentage of the elderly in Vietnam are receiving public pensions, while others are 
living on their own and/or supported by family members (Ministry of Labour, Invalids, and Social 
Affairs (MOLISA), 2005). In addition, a potentially worrisome issue for supporting the elderly is 
that the past decade witnessed a continuous decline in the multi-generational family model, in 
which the number of elderly who lived as dependents declined, while the number of elderly who 
lived alone or in households with only elderly increased (Giang and Pfau, 2007a; Institute of 
Labour Science and Social Affairs (ILSSA) and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), 2007). 
Thus, any reduction in family support caused by such trends will leave the elderly behind with 
further vulnerabilities. The above situation demands that policy makers and social researchers 
provide more attention to discussing and introducing social welfare programs that can protect the 
elderly people in Vietnam.  
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Recently, social pensions, which are sometimes known as non-contributory pensions (NCP) 
or cash transfer programs for the elderly, have emerged in many countries in Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America. A number of studies show that these schemes are playing an important role in 
reducing elderly poverty as they can bring economic, social, and health benefits to the elderly 
recipients and their families. For example, Barrientos and Lloyd-Sherlock (2002) indicate that the 
rate of extremely poor would have been 16 percentage points higher in the absence of a social 
pension in Argentina. Similarly, Barrientos (2005) shows that people in households receiving a 
social pension are 18 per cent and 12.5 per cent less likely to be poor in Brazil and South Africa, 
respectively. In the poor and low-income countries, social pensions substantially contribute to 
reducing poverty and vulnerabilities of the elderly. HelpAge International–HAI (2004) shows that 
a social pension becomes the main source of income for Namibian poor households during 
droughts, helps many elderly and children in HIV/AIDS-affected households in Botswana, and 
empowers Indian female poor in their families. The existing social pension schemes are helping to 
significantly reduce poverty incidence for millions of people, while costing a small percentage of 
GDP in the studied countries, such as less than 2 per cent of GDP in Namibia (HAI, 2004), less 
than 1 per cent of GDP in Nepal and Botswana, and 2 per cent of GDP in Mauritius and Antigua 
(Willmore, 2004).   
Learning from such findings, many researchers have examined the likely impacts of social 
pension programs for countries where they do not yet exist. These studies are usually completed by 
simulating the impact of a social pension program had it been created at some point in the past, and 
they generally find the potential for significant reductions in the elderly poverty (see, for example, 
Bhorat, 2003 for South Africa; Gassman and Behrendt, 2006 for Senegal and Tanzania; and 
Kakwani et al., 2006 for Kenya).  
In Vietnam, a social pension scheme was implemented in 2004 to provide a benefit of 65,000 
Vietnamese dong (VND) (or about US$ 4.2)1 per month to the elderly aged ninety and over who 
did not receive a pension from the contributory system. In April 2007, the eligible age was revised 
to eighty-five and over, and the benefit was increased to VND 120,000 (about US$ 7.5) per month. 
Yet, the real coverage rate is low, as more than two-thirds of the eligible individuals have not 
received any benefit, and even some provinces have not carried out this scheme (National 
Assembly’s Committee for Social Affairs, 2006). A recent report (ILSSA and UNFPA, 2007) 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise stated, throughout the paper we will use the average exchange rate in 2004 reported by International 
Monetary Fund (2007), in which $US 1 was equal VND 15,705.  
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shows that the impacts of the current scheme are limited in terms of both coverage and poverty 
reduction, though it has been able to help the recipients overcome certain difficulties. 
Under swift social and economic changes and expected ageing population in the coming 
years for Vietnam, two urgent questions are how an extended social pension scheme can help to 
reduce poverty for the elderly people, and how much such a scheme will cost. Previously, Giang 
and Pfau (2008) and Weeks et al. (2004) simulated a universal old-age pension scheme in Vietnam, 
and they find that such a scheme would cost about 2-3 per cent of the GDP. However, with limited 
financial capacities for a country like Vietnam, it is necessary for a social pension scheme to be 
effective in various aspects, including financial costs, poverty reduction, and welfare improvement. 
And as such, different scenarios for a social pension scheme need to be further explored.  
Guided by these research and policy needs, our paper aims to simulate how the poverty 
incidence of the elderly in Vietnam would have been changed in the presence of a social pension 
scheme. We consider a number of categorical targeting groups of elderly people along with various 
transfer parameters to assess the impacts of the scheme on their social welfare. The categorical 
targets include all elderly, only rural elderly, only female elderly, and elderly living in the poorest 
regions. We compare different programs based on their overall costs by varying the categorical 
target groups, the eligible age for benefits, and the benefit levels. In general, we find that there 
would be obvious tradeoffs: more expenditure would result in more poverty reduction, but also 
lead to more costs and leakages. More importantly, even with small budgeting, our simulations 
imply that a social pension scheme would significantly reduce poverty incidence for the elderly. In 
particular, we find evidence that focusing a program on rural elderly would be the most effective in 
a number of ways, and that the programs with lower eligibility ages and lower benefits would have 
a bigger impact on poverty than the programs with comparable costs that provide higher benefits 
but also have higher eligibility ages.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we will present our 
data and estimation methodology. Then, we will discuss the empirical results and policy 
implications. The last section of the paper will provide concluding remarks.       
 
DATA AD METHODOLOGY 
Data 
To pursue the above-mentioned research objectives, we will use the Vietnam Household 
Living Standard Survey in 2004, namely VHLSS 2004. This is one of the four household surveys 
in Vietnam over the past decade conducted by the General Statistics Office (GSO) along with other 
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international agencies, as a part of the World Bank’s Living Standard Measurement Surveys 
(LSMS). Descriptions of this survey can be found in World Bank (2005) and GSO (2007). Unless 
otherwise noted, our calculations will use sample weights to make the data representative for the 
entire population in Vietnam. 
The survey is organized by household, but it also includes some characteristics for 
individuals in the household, such as age, gender, relationship to the household head, marital status, 
working status, wages, health status, and educational attainment. This structure lets us identify the 
elderly people (aged sixty and over), as well as the elderly households (which include at least one 
elderly person). The VHLSS 2004 includes 39,696 individuals in 9,189 households, in which the 
number of elderly people and the number of elderly households are 3,806 and 2,784, respectively. 
At the household level, the survey provides information on the sources of income, household 
expenditures, ownership of consumer durables, business and agricultural activities, poverty 
incidence, participation in the poverty alleviation programs, as well as social insurance, wealth, and 
housing conditions.  
However, the data also have some limitations. Besides wages, most income sources are only 
identified at the household level, so it is not clear which member is the source of household income. 
Similarly, expenditure is identified at the household level, so we do not know who is spending and 
can only identify per-capita expenditure within the household. Also, wealth data are only available 
at the household level. These problems limit our ability to analyze intra-household sharing.  
Methodology 
The main aims of our paper are to quantify the potential role and to estimate the financial cost 
of a social pension scheme in reducing the elderly poverty in Vietnam. Our analysis will apply 
micro-simulation techniques with the VHLSS 2004 data. We will first consider various groups of 
elderly as scheme targets in order to see how the proposed schemes would be able to reduce elderly 
poverty, and how much they would cost. Then, under different fixed budget levels, we will 
simulate a number of alternatives to look for the most effective scheme in terms of poverty 
reduction and welfare improvement. Finally, we will investigate how the program costs would 
increase over time as a result of continued population ageing in Vietnam.    
Measuring Poverty Incidence  
This paper will measure poverty using the poverty rate, poverty gap, and poverty severity. 
We will apply these measures for the recipient population, the overall elderly population, and the 
total population of all ages. The poverty rate represents the percentage of population whose 
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expenditures are lower than the official poverty line.2 In 2004, the official poverty line was 
measured by per-capita expenditure per year and was VND 2,077 thousand (or $US 132.3). The 
poverty gap indicates how much money is needed to close the gap between per capita expenditure 
and the official poverty line for each member of the population (it is zero for the non-poor). We 
must be clear that we define this as an absolute measure of income, such that Vietnam’s poverty 
gap would be defined as the total amount of money required to bring the expenditures of all poor 
people up to the poverty line. Poverty severity is calculated as the sum of squares of individual 
poverty gaps, which puts extra weight on those experiencing more extreme poverty. All these 
poverty measures are weighted by the household size, so that they are representative for the whole 
Vietnamese population as well as the elderly population. 
To examine the sensitivity of these poverty measures to the poverty line, we will introduce 
three poverty lines: (i) 50 per cent of the official line, which allows for a focus on extreme poverty; 
(ii) 100 per cent of the official line; and (iii) 167 per cent of the official line, which corresponds to 
the commonly used relative poverty line of 50 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) per-capita, 
and this allows for consideration of those above the official poverty line but still vulnerable to 
poverty.  
Regarding the official poverty measure, one problem is that it is based on per-capita 
expenditure, which is estimated by dividing total expenditure of a household by the number of 
household members. As indicated in many studies, such as Barrientos (2006) and Deaton (1997), 
such a measure is established for the household as a whole rather than for particular individuals, 
and it may underestimate or overestimate poverty rates under different household settings. 
Underestimation could occur when a household member is deprived of consumption by other 
members, and overestimation could occur, for instance, if larger households can enjoy economies 
of scale from living together that reduce their overall needed expenditures. Therefore, to mitigate 
possible biases of the official poverty measure, we will introduce an alternative equivalence scale. 
As such, our paper will consider two measures for household expenditure: (i) officially-used per-
capita expenditure or the ‘official per-capita equivalence scale’, and (ii) the ‘alternative adult 
equivalence scale’. The latter is adopted from Barrientos (2005), and can be defined with the 
following equation: 
                                                 
2 In Vietnam, there are two poverty lines. The first line, namely ‘food poverty line’, is measured by the annual amount 
of money required to purchase a ‘typical’ basket of food items providing 2,100 calories per person per day. The second 
line, which is the ‘official poverty line’, includes the purchase of the aforementioned basket of food items and the 
purchase of a ‘minimal’ amount of non-food items. In our paper, we use the second definition of poverty line. See 
Phung (2004) for further explanations of how the Vietnamese poverty lines are estimated and adjusted over time. 
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αβ children]#1-adult[#1
eExpenditur Household Total
Scale eEquivalencAdult  eAlternativ
++
= ,                                  (1) 
where β=0.5; and α=0.75. When β=1 and α=1, we get the ‘official per-capita equivalence scale’. 
When β is less than unity, the formula recognizes that expenditures for children need not to be as 
large as those for adults, and the α term accounts for the economies of scale enjoyed by larger 
households.  
Categorical Targeting Groups  
In this paper, we will consider the following four categories of elderly social pension 
beneficiaries. As will be discussed later, these categories are chosen based on an attempt to find 
more vulnerable groups. Note that none of these categories include means-testing of income or 
wealth, because the administrative burden of such programs in Vietnam would be immense.3 We 
do note that if perfect targeting were possible, elderly poverty could be eliminated with an 
expenditure at 0.1 per cent of GDP, while eliminating the poverty of all members of elderly 
households would cost 0.4 per cent of GDP, and eliminating all poverty in Vietnam would cost 1.1 
per cent of GDP.  
Eligible elderly for the following categories should be relatively easy to identify: 
(1) All elderly (namely ‘ALL’). This is a universal scheme.  
(2) Only elderly living in areas classified as rural (namely ‘RUR’);  
(3) Only female elderly (namely ‘FEM’);  
(4) Only elderly living in the Northwest and Central Highlands regions, which are the 
poorest regions in Vietnam (namely ‘REG’). 
Measuring Impact and Effectiveness of the Proposed Social Pension Schemes  
In our estimation, we will calculate how the poverty rate, poverty gap, and poverty severity of 
the elderly would have been changed, in percentage terms, if a social pension scheme had been 
introduced in the past in Vietnam. The higher the percentage change, the more effective the scheme 
would be. 
Another measure for the cost effectiveness of the proposed schemes is the percentage of the 
total cost that would have been actually used to reduce the poverty incidence of the elderly 
recipients, the overall elderly population, and the total population of Vietnam. This provides an 
idea about the leakage rate of benefits to non-poor elderly, to poor non-elderly, and to non-poor 
                                                 
3 Recent evaluation by Ministry of Labour, Invalids, and Social Affairs (MOLISA) and United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) (2004) on social protection programs in Vietnam showed that the targeting of beneficiaries was 
generally effective as most of the recipients were in fact very poor, and that reliance on means testing has had a 
negative effect on program coverage.   
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non-elderly. We estimate only the total cost for benefit payments and exclude administrative costs 
for the proposed schemes.    
Also, for the potential impact on welfare, we will estimate changes in utility of the elderly 
population and the total population, which are measured as the sum of changes in the logarithms of 
their respective expenditures. Individual expenditures will be estimated using both of the 
previously mentioned equivalence scales. This measure of utility allows for diminishing returns 
from expenditures such that benefits received by the poor will have a greater impact, and it does 
not require setting any poverty line. Also, since we will not collect taxes as a source for paying 
benefits in our simulations, utility changes will be always positive, and it is matter of finding the 
program with the largest impact for a given cost.  
Main Assumptions for Simulating Impacts of the Proposed Social Pension Schemes 
We use the VHLSS 2004 data to simulate a counterfactual situation in which a social pension 
scheme had been introduced in the past. To do this, we first assume that the eligible elderly’s 
benefits from the social pension scheme will be added to their household’s total expenditures, and 
then divided equally among each member of the household. This is a necessary assumption, 
because we are unable to account for differentiated individual expenditures within the household. 
Under this assumption, the proposed social pension scheme would reduce poverty incidence for 
various groups of people, including poor elderly, non-poor elderly, poor non-elderly, and non-poor 
non-elderly. 
Second, we assume that everything other than the social pension benefit will remain the same. 
In other words, the elderly and their relatives or family members will not change their behaviors in 
response to the potential gain from such a social pension scheme. Also, there will be no 
macroeconomic feedbacks from the introduction of a scheme. We must admit that these 
assumptions are obviously strong, since there would be a number of potential biases in introducing 
a social pension scheme for different elderly categories. For instance, the social pension scheme for 
elderly living in rural areas might encourage the urban elderly to move to rural areas. To the extent 
that such behaviours occur, program costs would be increased beyond our estimates. 
Third, we also assume that such a social pension scheme would be operated under limited 
budgeting. We will first assume that the total benefit cost of the proposed scheme must be about 1 
per cent of GDP in 2004, and we find the programs that match this criterion. To find the programs 
with specific total costs, we vary the categorical target groups, the eligibility ages, and the benefit 
levels while calculating total costs and searching for matches. Then the total cost will be allowed to 
vary between 0.25 per cent and 1.5 per cent of GDP, which is a common range for many 
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developing countries that are considering a social pension program (see, for instance, Schwarz, 
2003; United Nations’ Department of Economics and Social Affairs (UN-DESA), 2007; Willmore, 
2007). Under these cost constraints, we will find the most effective program in terms of poverty 
reduction and welfare improvement for the different poverty lines and equivalence scale measures, 
which will provide information about the robustness and sensitivity of the results to different 
assumptions.  
Simulating the Future Costs of the Proposed Social Pension Schemes under Population Ageing  
To estimate the future costs of the proposed social pensions, we will apply a simulation 
method proposed by Willmore (2007). Suppose that the eligible elderly account for e per cent of 
the total population, and the social pension benefit provided to each person is equal to b per cent of 
per-capita GDP. The total expenditure of the scheme without administrative costs will be t per cent 
of GDP, in which t=e*b. This estimate implies that the benefit is not linked to the poverty line, 
because the poverty line grows with inflation rather than GDP. To the extent that GDP will grow 
faster than inflation, it indicates a growth of the benefit in terms of its percentage of the poverty 
line. Also, more eligible elderly or a higher benefit means more expected costs for the scheme. We 
will use the data from the population projections of United Nations (2007) for Vietnam during 
2005-2050, which are based on three scenarios for fertility rates, including low-variant, medium-
variant, and high-variant fertility rates. The low fertility rate leads to a high elderly rate (as a per 
cent of the population), and this is our high cost scenario. The medium cost scenario represents the 
UN’s best forecast, and the low cost scenario includes a high fertility rate and so a low elderly rate. 
To get consistent projections, we will first adjust the UN forecasts for elderly rates upward so that 
the 2005 values match the elderly rate in the VHLSS 2004 (7.6 per cent and 9.9 per cent, 
respectively).       
 
FIDIGS AD DISCUSSIO 
Demographic Characteristics and Poverty Status of the Elderly 
Before analyzing social pension schemes, we first consider basic characteristics and poverty 
for Vietnam’s elderly. Table 1 provides general information about the elderly in Vietnam in 2004.  
[Table 1 about here] 
By age, young elderly (aged 60-69) accounted for about 50 per cent of the elderly population, 
while the oldest elderly (aged eighty and over) accounted for about 15 per cent. The estimates 
show that, by all three poverty lines, the elderly at more advanced ages generally experienced 
higher poverty rates than did the younger elderly. 
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Regarding gender, female elderly were more prevalent and experienced a higher poverty rate 
than did their male counterparts. Meanwhile, about 60 per cent of the elderly were married. By all 
three poverty thresholds, the married elderly had significantly lower poverty rates than did their 
non-married counterparts, most of whom were widows.  
In terms of residential areas, more than 70 per cent of the elderly were still living in rural 
areas. This number, however, has been declining over the past decade on the account of the 
emerging urbanization (Giang and Pfau, 2007a). The results show that, by any of three poverty 
thresholds, the urban elderly had a substantially lower poverty rate than did their rural counterparts. 
Similarly, the results for residential regions show that more than 70 per cent of the elderly were 
living in the four largest rice-producing regions in Vietnam, i.e., the Red River Delta, the Northeast, 
the Southeast, and the Mekong River Delta. The elderly living in these regions had lower poverty 
rates than did the elderly living in other regions. In particular, with all three poverty thresholds, the 
elderly living in the Northwest experienced the most poverty, and the elderly living in the 
Southeast region experienced the least.  
By living arrangements, more than 75 per cent of the elderly were living with their children, 
and about 20 per cent of the elderly were living in households with only elderly. As shown in 
Giang and Pfau (2007a), the percentage of households with only elderly tended to increase in 
recent years, while the percentage of the elderly living with children tended to decrease. 
Distinguishing further by marital status and living arrangements, Giang and Pfau (2008) find a 
worrying situation in that more than 80 per cent of elderly living alone were female elderly living 
in rural areas. The estimated results in Table 1 show that the elderly households with only elderly 
had the highest poverty rate under the first poverty line, while the households where the elderly 
were living with children had the highest rate under the second and third poverty lines. This 
situation can be understood by the fact that larger households tend to have lower per-capita 
expenditures. 
Finally, only 35 per cent of the elderly were in households receiving some forms of social 
security benefits. The number was even much lower when considering only pensions (Giang and 
Pfau, 2008). The results show that the recipient elderly households had lower poverty rates than did 
their non-recipient counterparts. 
Table 1 highlights our choice of the four categorical targets, which tend to reflect the groups 
with higher poverty rates. 
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Impacts of the Proposed Social Pension Schemes on Poverty 
We now consider the potential impacts of different social pension schemes on elderly poverty 
in Vietnam, as well as their respective financial costs. Table 2 presents our estimates, which are 
based on the assumption that a pension of 50 per cent of the official poverty line is provided to all 
eligible people aged sixty and over. It is important to note that these estimates are not directly 
comparable, because of the differing number of recipients and the differing costs. However, we 
first provide an overview of how the impacts differ among the four categories, and in subsequent 
tables we will analyze programs with the same costs. 
[Table 2 about here] 
In general, the estimates show that the total benefits paid would vary from VND 436 billion 
($US 27.8 million, or 0.06 per cent of GDP in 2004) for a scheme introduced in the two poorest 
regions to VND 8,179 billion ($US 520.7 million, or 1.14 per cent of GDP in 2004) for a universal 
scheme. The estimates show that more than 50 per cent of the estimated costs would be spent by 
non-elderly people in the elderly households, meaning that the leakage rates in all proposed 
schemes would be high. Again, this result occurs on account of our assumption that the recipient’s 
benefit becomes a part of the household’s spending resources, and is subsequently shared equally 
by all household members. 
Regarding the impacts on poverty, the estimates provide useful information about the 
possible reduction in poverty rates and poverty gaps for the direct recipients, the whole elderly 
population, and the whole population in Vietnam. Generally, the estimates indicate that the 
magnitude of reductions in poverty rates and poverty gaps for the elderly would vary for different 
targeting categories. For instance, in the case of a universal scheme, the poverty rate of the direct 
recipients would decrease from 17.9 per cent (without scheme) to 9.3 per cent (with scheme), while 
that of the whole population in Vietnam would decrease from 19.3 per cent to 17.4 per cent. 
The last panel of Table 2 can help to compare the cost effectiveness of different proposed 
social pension models, which is measured as the percentage of total benefit payments that helps to 
reduce the poverty gap, or in other words, that are received by poor individuals. We refer to this as 
the poverty reduction efficiency. In this sense, the scheme providing benefits to the elderly in the 
two poorest regions would be most effective, as it would result in the highest percentage of benefits 
used to reduce poverty gaps for the direct recipients (10.03 per cent), the whole elderly population 
(10.03 per cent), and the whole population in Vietnam (31.33 per cent). A program targeting rural 
residents or a program targeting females follows in terms of the portion of benefits that are devoted 
to reducing the poverty gap for the elderly and total population.  
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[Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 provide additional information about the costs and impacts when we 
vary two key parameters: the starting eligible age and the benefit level. Both figures are created for 
the universal targeting scheme, in which all elderly at least as old as the eligible age would receive 
a benefit. These figures are made using the official poverty line to measure poverty, and using the 
official per-capita equivalence scale. They help to show how such a universal scheme under 
different assumptions would reduce poverty rates and poverty gaps for the elderly and the whole 
population in Vietnam. We can also see the financial costs of such schemes. 
In Figure 1, we assume a benefit level equal to 50 per cent of the official poverty line, and we 
vary the starting eligible age from sixty to ninety. The total benefits paid will decrease as the 
eligible age is higher. Though it varies by starting age, the percentage of benefits that reduce 
poverty for direct recipients is always less than 6 per cent. For elderly as a whole, higher starting 
ages do witness an upward trend in this cost effectiveness measure, but still less than 8 per cent of 
benefits reduce elderly poverty. Even for the whole population, the percentage of benefits that 
reduce poverty fluctuates between just 12 and 18 per cent.  The lower panel of Figure 1 shows how 
the poverty rate and poverty gap of the recipients, the whole elderly population, and the whole 
population of Vietnam would be changed with the presence of the proposed scheme. In general, 
these graphs show diminishing poverty reduction for the whole elderly population and the whole 
population of Vietnam as the starting eligible age is higher and total expenditures are less. As for 
recipients, the starting eligible age does not have much impact on the portion of benefits that 
reduce the poverty gap. 
Meanwhile, in Figure 2 we present a universal social pension scheme for all elderly aged 
sixty and over, and we vary the benefit level from 5 per cent to 200 per cent of the official poverty 
line. Because this is a universal scheme for all elderly, the recipient population is always the same 
as the elderly population. Naturally, the total benefit cost will be increased at a linear rate as the 
benefit level increases. The leakage rate of the proposed scheme also increases with increasing 
benefits, as we can observe a decline in the percentage of benefits that reduce the poverty gap as 
the benefit level increases. Poverty continues to be reduced with higher benefits, but the marginal 
poverty reduction decreases as benefits increase. To summarize, what this figure illustrates is that 
an increasing benefit level produces diminishing marginal poverty reduction, and that even a 
relatively small benefit level can have significant impacts on poverty.    
[Table 3 about here] 
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Given limited government revenue, we now consider in Table 3 all the alternatives of a social 
pension scheme in Vietnam, in which the target for spending would be approximately 1 per cent of 
GDP in 2004. The GDP in 2004 was VND 715,000 billion (or about US$ 45.5 billion). In addition, 
our estimates for all four categorical targeting schemes assume that the poverty line is measured as 
100 per cent of the official line, and equivalence scale is the official per-capita expenditure. Under 
these assumptions, we can estimate the starting eligible age (which can range from sixty to ninety) 
and benefit level (which can range from 5 per cent to 200 per cent of the official poverty line) 
provided to the eligible elderly. Also, we can measure the percentage changes in poverty gap, 
poverty severity, and utility for the elderly population and the whole population of Vietnam. The 
most effective programs can be chosen from the list, depending on the desired outcome measure. 
For instance, Table 3 shows that we would choose a scheme providing to the rural elderly aged 
sixty and over a benefit of 60 per cent of official poverty line, because this scheme generally would 
be most successful in reducing the poverty gap and poverty severity and enhance utility by the 
most in comparison with other schemes. In particular, this program could reduce the elderly 
poverty gap by 59.68 per cent and the total poverty gap by 14.86 per cent. And though each 
program would have a slight difference in total benefit cost, it is important that we generally find 
for any given category that bigger poverty reduction occurs with lower starting eligible ages and 
lower benefit levels. This provides an important policy recommendation: it would be better to 
reduce the eligible age and reduce the benefit level than to increase the eligible age and increase 
the benefit level for any given total program cost. 
We also note that the category ‘REG’ (for elderly living in the two poorest regions) does not 
appear in Table 3, because the number of elderly in this group is too small to be able to spend 1 per 
cent of GDP with benefits less than 200 per cent of the official poverty line.   
[Table 4 about here] 
Moving forward, Table 4 provides a robustness check by expanding the results of Table 3 to 
include a range of total spending levels, additional poverty lines, and both types of equivalence 
scales. We vary the total benefit spending for a social pension in Vietnam from about 0.25 per cent 
to about 1.5 per cent of the GDP in 2004. This is a common range for cost projections in many 
developing economies (see, for example, UN-DESA, 2007). Because we vary these additional 
details, in Table 4 we only list the programs that provide an optimal result for various outcome 
measures. This would be equivalent to showing the two rows of pension schemes for rural elderly 
from Table 3 that have boldfaced results, and only showing the numbers that are boldfaced in 
Table 3. 
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As can be seen in the table, for any given poverty line and equivalence scale, there would be 
an obvious tradeoff between the starting eligible age and the benefit level, though the impacts of 
each proposed scheme on the elderly poverty would vary. For example, under the official poverty 
line and the official per-capita equivalence scale measures, at the total cost of 0.25 per cent of GDP 
in 2004, we can choose either a scheme providing a benefit of 20 per cent of the poverty line to all 
rural elderly aged sixty-five and over or a scheme providing a benefit of 25 per cent of the poverty 
line to all rural elderly aged sixty-eight and over. Furthermore, which scheme we will finally 
choose depends on which criteria of impacts we are considering. In the aforementioned cases, for 
example, if we are focusing on poverty reduction, we will choose the former scheme as it could be 
able to reduce all poverty indices by the most for the whole elderly population and the whole 
population of Vietnam, while we will choose the latter scheme if we are considering the potential 
impact on our social welfare function. 
The table also allows us to observe the diminishing returns to poverty reduction as the total 
costs increase. For instance, with the official poverty line and the official per-capita equivalence 
scale, the most effective program costing about 0.5 per cent of GDP could be able to reduce elderly 
poverty by 40.7 per cent. Beyond this, the additional poverty reduction when increasing spending 
from 0.5 per cent to 1 per cent of GDP would only be 19 percentage points, and when costs 
increase from 1 per cent to 1.5 per cent of GDP, the marginal reduction in the elderly poverty 
would be only an additional 7.2 percentage points. We could also observe this effect earlier when 
describing Figure 2. This detail illustrates that strong poverty reduction can be achieved even with 
only a rather limited budget for the social pension. Related to this point, we note that when we 
look at severe poverty by using a poverty threshold that is 50 per cent of the official poverty line, 
even with spending of only 0.5 per cent of GDP, we can eliminate more than 70 per cent of severe 
elderly poverty, and more than 20 per cent of severe poverty for the whole population. Even an 
expenditure of 0.25 per cent of GDP could eliminate half of the severe elderly poverty. 
In addition, we also note that for the various poverty lines and equivalence scales, the 
category ‘RUR’ (for elderly living in rural areas) shows up repeatedly across the range of 
expenditures. In particular, under both 100-percent and 167-percent official poverty lines and both 
equivalence scales, only this category shows up. This means that under limited budgeting and 
desired poverty reduction, targeting rural areas would provide the most effective use of limited 
resources to reduce poverty for the elderly. 
Another interesting finding from Table 4 is that under different poverty lines and total cost 
levels, the proposed social pension schemes using the alternative adult equivalence scale would 
GRIPS Policy Research                       Center Discussion Paper: 10-09 
 16
generally have greater impacts on poverty reduction than those using the official per-capita 
equivalence scale. This provides another important policy implication: preciseness in poverty 
measurements is extremely crucial in evaluating social program impacts.  
Future Costs for the Proposed Schemes under Demographic Changes 
A number of studies on social pensions, such as UN-DESA (2007) and Willmore (2007), 
show that the biggest concern for any developing country in implementing such a scheme is 
whether the cost of the scheme would be feasible, given various economic constraints. This 
question is important for the case of Vietnam as well, and in this section we attempt to project the 
costs of these programs to assess the impacts of population ageing and other potential demographic 
trends. As mentioned earlier, we will use a simulation approach proposed by Willmore (2007) to 
estimate the expected financial costs of the proposed social pension schemes in Vietnam through 
2050. We will focus on simulating costs for different schemes for categories ‘ALL’ (a universal 
scheme) and ‘RUR’ (a scheme for only rural elderly). The initial cost in 2004 of each program we 
consider is about 1 per cent of GDP. For example, we will estimate future costs for a universal 
scheme providing a benefit of 55 per cent of the official poverty line to all elderly aged sixty-four 
and over, or a scheme providing a benefit of 60 per cent of the official poverty line to all rural 
elderly aged sixty and over.  
In our estimates, we use the data from the population projections of United Nations (2007) 
for Vietnam in the period 2005-2050, which provide the three aforementioned population scenarios. 
Due to slight differences in elderly-related data between United Nations (2007) and VHLSS 2004, 
we first calibrate data from these sources, so as to get consistent elderly population projections. For 
the projections of rural elderly population, we assume that the percentage of the elderly population 
living in rural areas will be the same as that of the general population in Vietnam. This is a 
necessary assumption, because we are unable to estimate the future rural rate of the elderly 
population independently. This assumption is also supported by the findings in Giang and Pfau 
(2007a) that the rural rate of the elderly was relatively close to that of the non-elderly over time.  
[Table 5 about here] 
Since United Nations (2007) only provides the rural rate projections for the general 
population until 2030, we expand the projections to 2050 with an assumption that speed of 
reductions in the rural rate will be diminishing from 2030 onward. Furthermore, we develop the 
high and low cost scenarios for the rural elderly rates by adding or subtracting 5 percentage points 
to the medium scenario. As illustration, Table 5 provides our calibrated and projected results for 
the elderly and rural elderly aged sixty and over. 
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[Figure 3 about here] 
Figure 3 shows projections for four schemes that initially cost about 1 per cent of GDP in 
2004. The upper panel of Figure 3 presents the estimated future costs for two universal social 
pension schemes, in which the one on the left provides a benefit of 55 per cent of the official 
poverty line to all elderly aged sixty-four and over (‘ALL64-55’), and the other on the right 
provides a benefit of 80 per cent of the official poverty line to all elderly aged sixty-nine and over 
(‘ALL69-80’). We can see that population ageing will lead to large-scale projected increases in the 
program costs, as the medium cost projections for both of these programs in 2050 will be about 3 
per cent of GDP.  
Meanwhile, the lower panel of Figure 3 shows the estimated future costs for two social 
pension schemes targeting rural elderly, in which the one on the left provides a benefit of 60 per 
cent of the official poverty line to all elderly living in rural areas (‘RUR60-60’), while the other on 
the right provides a benefit of 200 per cent of the official poverty line to all elderly aged seventy-
five and over (‘RUR75-200’). As shown in the figure, the projected costs will increase more slowly 
on account of the projected future urbanization, and the medium cost projections for both of these 
programs in 2050 will be about 2 per cent of GDP.  
[Figure 4 about here] 
Figure 4 compares the medium cost projections for different social pensions in the two 
above-mentioned categories, in which the upper panel of the figure shows the estimates for 
universal schemes (‘ALL’), while the lower panel presents the estimates for rural targeting 
schemes (‘RUR’). The initial cost in 2004 of these schemes is about 1 per cent of GDP. From this 
figure, we can see that programs with higher eligibility ages and higher benefits will initially 
experience lower cost increases because the oldest elderly rates will grow more slowly, but 
eventually in the next forty years these programs will grow in costs and exceed the costs of other 
programs as the oldest elderly become a more dominant force. 
  
COCLUDIG REMARKS 
Older persons living in countries with comprehensive formal pension systems and public 
transfer schemes are less likely to fall into poverty than younger cohorts in the same population 
(UN-DESA, 2007). Without these formal systems, elderly tend to rely on informal support from 
their families. But under swift social and economic changes, the traditional living arrangements, in 
which different generations live together and support each other, may be deteriorated or may not be 
able to fully protect elderly against the risk of destitution. Limited coverage of the formal social 
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protection system creates great challenges for providing adequate income security to the elderly. 
Vietnam is experiencing this situation, and it is thus suggested that Vietnam should have a more 
comprehensive social transfer scheme to protect millions of elderly. Using VHLSS 2004 with 
micro-simulation techniques, we examined the impact and cost of introducing an extended social 
pension scheme for the Vietnamese elderly. Our estimates generally show that such a scheme 
would significantly reduce poverty incidence for the elderly, particularly in rural areas, and evolve 
to cost about 3.5 per cent of GDP at the highest in 2050. These findings are quite robust for 
different measures of poverty lines and equivalence scales.  
The issues of accessibility, affordability, and sustainability of social transfer schemes are 
increasingly debated in a number of studies and policy roundtables, as they are core issues for 
design and implementation. In this regard, the findings of our paper can provide a number of 
implications for other poor and low-income countries in considering social pension schemes to 
reduce poverty incidence for the elderly. First, targeting rural areas might be the most effective 
way to reduce elderly poverty under limited financial capacity. Second, schemes providing lower 
benefits to wider group of beneficiaries would be more effective in reducing poverty and 
improving welfare than those providing higher benefits to limited beneficiaries. Third, very small 
expenditures can potentially have big impacts, and the long-term cost of a social pension scheme as 
a percentage of GDP can be small. Lastly, the precise poverty measure used is important in both 
policy examination and evaluation. If a social pension scheme is carefully considered and 
implemented, it can complement a contributory pension scheme to create a comprehensive 
multilayered social protection system.  
As with previous studies on the topic, there are still limitations to be addressed in future 
research. For instance, behavioural assumptions need to be further examined with the introduction 
of such proposed schemes, as we do not estimate the potential crowding out effects and reduced 
work effort. Additionally, if benefit receipt changes elderly living arrangements, either because it 
provides the means to allow for independent living or because other family members wish to move 
in and share the pension, then this will further affect the program impacts resulting from our 
assumption that benefits are shared with each member of the household. A final issue to be 
subsequently addressed is how to effectively administer the proposed schemes, especially in the 
countries with a low level of transparency and ineffective governance.    
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TABLES 
 
 
Table 1. Demographic Characteristics and Poverty Status of the Elderly, 2004 
Official poverty line is 2,077 thousand V3D ($US 132.3) per capita;  
Poverty rates are calculated using the official per-capita equivalence scale 
 
Indicators 
Per cent of Elderly 
Population (%) 
Poverty Rates for Varying Poverty Lines 
50% Official 100% Official 167% Official 
Elderly People  1.5 17.9 47.2 
Age     
 60 – 69 49.7 0.9 14.7 42.1 
 70 – 79 35.2 1.8 21.0 51.4 
 80 and older 15.1 2.6 21.0 54.4 
Gender     
 Male 41.6 1.2 16.4 44.0 
 Female 58.4 1.7 18.9 49.5 
Marital Status     
 Married 60.5 1.2 15.8 44.2 
 Non-married 39.5 2.0 21.1 51.9 
Areas     
 Urban 26.7 0.1 4.3 16.3 
 Rural 73.3 2.0 22.8 58.5 
Region     
 Red River Delta 25.8 0.7 16.3 45.2 
 North East 10.5 1.3 25.2 64.1 
 North West 1.9 4.6 53.2 72.9 
 North Central Coast 12.6 4.3 31.2 62.1 
 South Central Coast 9.9 2.8 21.6 55.0 
 Central Highlands 3.4 3.7 24.1 53.7 
 South East 15.4 0.3 2.8 13.7 
 Mekong River Delta 20.6 0.5 13.1 50.0 
Living Arrangements     
 Only Elderly 20.7 1.8 16.8 45.5 
 With Children 75.5 1.4 18.6 48.7 
 With Others, no Children 3.8 1.1 10.5 32.2 
Receiving Social Security?     
 Yes 34.9 1.3 15.7 40.0 
 No 65.1 1.5 18.6 51.1 
Source: Own calculations using VHLSS 2004. 
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Table 2. Estimated Impacts of the Proposed Social Pension Schemes 
A pension of 50 per cent of the poverty line is provided to eligible people aged sixty and over  
(Poverty is calculated using the official poverty line and the official per-capita equivalence scale) 
 
Indicators All  Elderly 
(ALL) 
Only Rural 
(RUR) 
Only Females 
(FEM) 
Poorest Regions 
(REG) 
Total Benefits Paid (V-D billion) 8178.8 5997.7 4778.2 435.9 
(As Per cent of GDP) 1.14 0.84 0.67 0.06 
   % Spent by Recipients 47.52 48.73 33.32 39.19 
   % Spent by Elderly 47.52 48.73 46.66 39.19 
   % Spent by Non-Elderly 52.48 51.27 53.34 60.81 
Direct Recipients 
   Ex-Ante Poverty Rate (%) 17.89 22.83 18.91 34.67 
   Ex-Post Poverty Rate (%) 9.27 12.07 11.48 25.23 
   % Change Poverty Rate -48.20 -47.13 -39.29 -27.24 
   Ex-Ante Poverty Gap (VND billion) 670.5 637.4 411.5 92.8 
   Ex-Post Poverty Gap (VND billion) 280.6 272.4 205.0 49.1 
   % Change Poverty Gap -58.15 -57.26 -50.19 -47.09 
Elderly 
   Ex-Ante Poverty Rate (%) 17.89 17.89 17.9 17.89 
   Ex-Post Poverty Rate (%) 9.27 10 12.0 17.38 
   % Change Poverty Rate -48.2 -44.11 -32.8 -2.81 
   Ex-Ante Poverty Gap (VND billion) 670.5 670.5 670.5 670.5 
   Ex-Post Poverty Gap (VND billion) 280.6 305.5 391.6 626.8 
   % Change Poverty Gap -58.15 -54.43 -41.6 -6.52 
Total Population 
   Ex-Ante Poverty Rate (%) 19.27 19.27 19.3 19.27 
   Ex-Post Poverty Rate (%) 17.35 17.55 18.0 19.13 
   % Change Poverty Rate -9.97 -8.9 -6.5 -0.72 
   Ex-Ante Poverty Gap (VND billion) 7659.6 7659.6 7659.6 7659.6 
   Ex-Post Poverty Gap (VND billion) 6595.3 6657.1 6941.5 7523 
   % Change Poverty Gap -13.9 -13.09 -9.4 -1.78 
Poverty Reduction Efficiency (Percentage of Total Cost that Reduces Poverty Gap) 
   Recipients -4.77 -6.08 -4.32 -10.03 
   Elderly -4.77 -6.08 -5.84 -10.03 
   Total Population -13.01 -16.71 -15.03 -31.33 
Source: Own calculations using VHLSS 2004. 
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Table 3. Choices for Programs that Cost about 1 per cent of GDP in 2004 
(between V3D 7,075 billion and V3D 7,225 billion, or $US 450.5 million and $US 460 million) 
Poverty line is the official poverty line; Poverty is calculated using the official per-capita equivalence scale 
 
Cat. Starting 
Age 
Benefit 
Level as % 
of Official 
Poverty 
Line 
Total 
Cost 
(VD 
billion) 
Change 
in 
poverty 
gap for 
elderly 
(%) 
Change in 
poverty gap 
for all 
(%) 
Change in 
poverty 
severity for 
elderly 
(%) 
Change in 
poverty 
severity for 
all 
(%) 
Change in 
utility for  
elderly 
(%) 
Change 
in utility 
for all 
(%) 
ALL 64 55 7128.7 -55.22 -12.98 -59.90 -14.70 1.51 0.33 
ALL 65 60 7187.3 -54.70 -12.93 -59.23 -14.63 1.52 0.33 
ALL 69 80 7191.0 -49.36 -12.19 -53.19 -13.49 1.48 0.33 
RUR 60 60 7197.2 -59.68 -14.86 -65.54 -17.19 1.65 0.37 
RUR 63 70 7188.2 -58.63 -14.68 -64.30 -16.83 1.66 0.37 
RUR 65 80 7161.5 -57.67 -14.51 -62.75 -16.46 1.65 0.36 
RUR 66 85 7138.2 -56.91 -14.23 -61.72 -15.97 1.64 0.36 
RUR 67 90 7094.4 -53.83 -13.69 -58.42 -15.33 1.62 0.36 
RUR 75 200 7224.2 -34.83 -10.04 -36.96 -10.67 1.34 0.33 
FEM 60 75 7167.3 -52.19 -12.52 -56.15 -13.94 1.45 0.33 
FEM 64 95 7212.8 -51.73 -12.64 -54.63 -13.75 1.45 0.34 
Note: ‘ALL’: for all elderly (or universal); ‘RUR’: for only rural elderly; and ‘FEM’: for only female elderly. 
Source: Own calculations using VHLSS 2004. 
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Table 4. The Most Effective Social Pension Schemes under a Variety of Conditions 
 
POVERTY LIE = 50% OF THE OFFICIAL POVERTY LIE 
Equivalence scale is the official per-capita equivalence scale 
Total cost 
as % of 
GDP in 
2004 
Category Starting 
Age 
Benefit 
Level 
as % of 
official 
poverty 
line 
Change 
of 
poverty 
gap  
for 
elderly 
(%) 
Change 
of poverty 
gap  
for all 
(%) 
Change of 
poverty 
severity  
for elderly 
(%) 
Change 
of 
poverty 
severity 
for all 
(%) 
Change 
in utility 
for 
elderly 
(%) 
Change in 
utility for 
all 
(%) 
0.25 
RUR 61 16      0.1017 
RUR 65 20 -49.86 -12.98 -59.82 -15.47 0.4739  
0.5 RUR 65 40 -70.55 -21.27 -77.97 -22.82 0.901 0.1943 
0.75 
RUR 63 52 -80.86      
RUR 64 56  -25.99 -86.81 -26.83 1.3021 0.2836 
1 
RUR 60 60      0.3670 
RUR 62 66 -87.22 -29.92 -92.57 -30.48   
RUR 63 70     1.6591  
1.5 RUR 61 94 -94.94 -34.22 -98.23 -33.39 2.3326 0.5253 
Equivalence scale is the alternative adult equivalence scale 
0.25 
ALL 71 24 -96.87 -50.78 -99.23 -51.56   
ALL 72 26 -96.87 -50.78 -99.23 -51.56   
ALL 73 28 -96.87 -50.78 -99.23 -51.56   
RUR 61 16      0.0973 
RUR 65 20     0.4599  
0.5 
ALL 60 22 -100 -52.22 -100 -51.94   
ALL 62 24 -100 -52.22 -100 -51.94   
ALL 63 26 -100 -52.22 -100 -51.94   
RUR 64 40     0.8743 0.1860 
0.75 
ALL 66 48  -50.78  -51.56   
ALL 69 60  -50.78  -51.56   
ALL 71 72  -50.78  -51.56   
ALL 72 78  -50.78  -51.56   
ALL 73 86  -50.78  -51.56   
RUR 64 56     1.2635 0.2715 
FEM 60 56 -97.79  -99.50    
FEM 62 62 -97.79  -99.50    
1 
ALL 60 44 -100 -52.22 -100 -51.94   
ALL 61 46 -100 -52.22 -100 -51.94   
ALL 63 52 -100 -52.22 -100 -51.94   
RUR 60 60      0.3514 
RUR 63 70     1.6099  
1.5 ALL 63 78 -100 -52.22 -100 -51.94   
 RUR 61 94     2.2635 0.5029 
(to be continued in the next page) 
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(continued from the previous page) 
POVERTY LIE = 100% OF THE OFFICIAL POVERTY LIE 
Equivalence scale is the official per-capita equivalence scale 
Total cost 
as % of 
GDP in 
2004 
Category Starting 
Age 
Benefit 
Level 
as % of 
official 
poverty 
line 
Change 
of 
poverty 
gap  
for 
elderly 
(%) 
Change 
of poverty 
gap  
for all 
(%) 
Change 
of poverty 
severity  
for 
elderly 
(%) 
Change 
of poverty 
severity 
for all 
(%) 
Change 
in utility 
for 
elderly 
(%) 
Change in 
utility for 
all 
(%) 
0.25 
RUR 61 16      0.1017 
RUR 65 20 -24.57 -5.08 -29.71 -6.29 0.4739  
0.5 RUR 65 40 -40.70 -9.00 -46.41 -10.72 0.901 0.1943 
0.75 RUR 64 56 -51.94 -12.32 -57.34 -14.22 1.3021 0.2836 
1 
RUR 60 60 -59.68 -14.86 -65.54 -17.19  0.3670 
RUR 63 70     1.6591  
1.5 RUR 61 94 -70.43 -19.09 -76.00 -21.51 2.3326 0.5253 
Equivalence scale is the alternative adult equivalence scale 
0.25 
RUR 61 16      0.0973 
RUR 65 20  -13.70   0.4599  
RUR 69 26    -18.38   
RUR 71 32 -43.57  -55.45    
0.5 
RUR 60 30    -27.69   
RUR 65 40 -65.85 -22.23   0.8743 0.1860 
RUR 66 42   -73.61    
0.75 
RUR 63 52    -33.32   
RUR 64 56 -78.09 -28.03 -83.48  1.2635 0.2715 
1 
RUR 60 60 -85.57 -32.58 -90.30 -37.74  0.3514 
RUR 63 70     1.6099  
1.5 RUR 61 94 -91.57 -37.71 -94.31 -41.81 2.2635 0.5029 
POVERTY LIE = 167% OF THE OFFICIAL POVERTY LIE 
Equivalence scale is the official per-capita equivalence scale 
Total cost 
as % of 
GDP in 
2004 
Category Starting 
Age 
Benefit 
Level 
as % of 
official 
poverty 
line 
Change 
of 
poverty 
gap  
for 
elderly 
(%) 
Change 
of poverty 
gap  
for all 
(%) 
Change 
of poverty 
severity  
for 
elderly 
(%) 
Change 
of poverty 
severity 
for all 
(%) 
Change 
in utility 
for 
elderly 
(%) 
Change in 
utility for 
all 
(%) 
0.25 
RUR 61 16      0.1017 
RUR 65 20 -11.38  -16.15  0.4739  
RUR 71 32    -3.29   
RUR 77 64  -2.32     
0.5 
RUR 65 40 -21.45  -28.60 -6.04 0.901 0.1943 
RUR 72 70  -4.33     
0.75 
RUR 64 56   -38.46 -8.45 1.3021 0.2836 
RUR 66 64 -30.04 -6.20     
1 
RUR 60 60   -46.06 -10.53  0.3670 
RUR 63 70     1.6591  
RUR 64 74 -37.04      
RUR 65 80 -37.04 -7.85     
1.5 RUR 61 94 -48.83 -10.88 -57.61 -14.07 2.3326 0.5253 
Equivalence scale is the alternative adult equivalence scale 
0.25 
RUR 61 16      0.0973 
RUR 65 20 -18.64 -5.09 -26.83 -7.58 0.4599  
0.5 RUR 65 40 -34.65 -9.60 -45.85 -13.37 0.8743 0.1860 
0.75 RUR 64 56 -47.81 -13.56 -59.61 -18.05 1.2635 0.2715 
1 
RUR 60 60  -16.86 -68.68 -21.76  0.3514 
RUR 63 70     1.6099  
RUR 64 74 -57.73      
1.5 RUR 61 94 -72.01 -22.02 -80.04 -26.85 2.2635 0.5029 
Source: Own calculations using VHLSS 2004. 
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Table 5. Calibrated and Projected Rates of Elderly and Rural Elderly aged Sixty and over 
 
  2004 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
% Rural Population 
(UN+Modification) 
  
  
Medium 74.1 71.7 68.9 65.8 62.4 58.7 55.3 52.2 49.4 47 
Low 74.1 66.7 63.9 60.8 57.4 53.7 50.3 47.2 44.4 42.0 
High 74.1 76.7 73.9 70.8 67.4 63.7 60.3 57.2 54.4 52.0 
% Elderly 
(aged 60 and over, 
UN+Modification) 
  
Medium 9.9 10.1 11.4 13.3 15.7 18.2 20.6 23.1 25.6 28.4 
Low 9.9 10.0 11.2 12.8 14.9 17.0 19.0 20.8 22.5 24.3 
High 9.9 10.2 11.7 13.8 16.6 19.5 22.6 25.9 29.3 33.4 
% Rural Elderly 
(aged 60 and over, 
UN+Modification) 
Medium 7.3 7.3 7.9 8.7 9.8 10.7 11.4 12.1 12.6 13.3 
Low 7.3 6.7 7.1 7.8 8.5 9.1 9.5 9.8 10.0 10.2 
High 7.3 7.8 8.6 9.8 11.2 12.4 13.6 14.8 16.0 17.4 
Note: Modifications are described in the text. 
Source: Own calculations using United Nations (2007) and VHLSS 2004. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Varying the Starting Eligible Age for a Universal Scheme 
with a Benefit of 50 per cent of the Official Poverty Line 
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Source: Own calculations using VHLSS 2004. 
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Figure 2. Varying the Benefit Level for All Elderly aged 60 and over 
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Source: Own calculations using VHLSS 2004. 
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Figure 3. Future Costs of the Proposed Social Pension Schemes 
for categories ‘ALL’ and ‘RUR’, 2004-2050  
Poverty line is the official poverty line; Poverty is calculated using the official per-capita equivalence scale 
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Source: Own calculations using data from United Nations (2007) and VHLSS 2004. 
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Figure 4. Cost Comparison within a Category 
Medium Cost Projections for Different Universal Schemes, 
w hich Cost about 1% GDP in 2004
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Medium Cost Projections for Different Rural Elderly Categories, 
w hich Cost about 1% GDP in 2004
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Source: Own calculations using data from United Nations (2007) and VHLSS 2004. 
 
 
